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used it as the conflict basis to quash the relief afforded below.
In vain have the Legislature and the lower courts attempted to
provide remedies to condominium associations for patent devel-
opers' fraud and overreaching, always running afoul of curiously
irrelevant decisions at this level.
The enigmatic formulation of another ill-founded decision in
this area of the law only serves to put Florida further out of
touch with the holdings of most jurisdictions. 7
MARc COOPER
GARAGEMAN'S LIEN: APPLICATION OF PROCEDURAL
DUE PROCESS SAFEGUARDS
Appellant, the owner of an automobile, was served with a notice of
sale advising him that in the event a bill for repairs was not paid, his
car, which was in the possession of a garageman, would be sold at a public
auction under the New York garageman's lien statute.1 The owner con-
tended that the repairs were not only unauthorized, but that the amount
charged by the garageman was unreasonable. After efforts to mediate the
dispute over the cost of repairs failed, appellant filed a complaint in the
District Court for the Eastern District of New York seeking a declara-
tory judgment that the statute violated the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, and an order enjoining the garageman from fore-
closing the lien.2 The complaint was dismissed and the automobile was
sold without a prior judicial determination of the amount claimed by
47. 282 So. 2d at 634.
1. N.Y. LIEN LAw §§ 184, 200-02, 204 (McKinney Supp. 1973).
2. Hernandez v. European Auto Collision, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 313 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). The
jurisdiction of the district court was invoked under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1343(3) (1970). 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970) provides that the district court shall have original jurisdiction
over any civil action:
To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the
Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal
rights of citizens or of all persons within the jutisdiction of the United States . ...
28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970), providing for a three-judge court in actions challenging the con-
stitutionality of a state law, was held inapplicable since no state officer was named as a party
defendant to the law suit. Hernandez v. European Auto Collision, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 313,
316-317 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
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the garageman as a debt.' On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held, reversed and remanded: If appellant is able
to prove the allegations of his complaint, the New York garageman's lien
statute violates the fourteenth amendment, as it deprives the owner of
due process of law by permitting a lien on his property to be foreclosed
without an opportunity for a hearing to determine the amount of the lien.
Hernandez v. European Auto Collision, Inc., 487 F.2d 378 (2d Cir.
1973).
Procedural due process requires that the government afford a person
notice and an opportunity to be heard before it can deprive him of his
property.' Recently, the due process clause has been held to embrace a
variety of property interests. The United States Supreme Court has ap-
plied the principles of due process to require notice and a prior adjudica-
tion before a creditor can garnish wages' or replevy household goods.'
The Court has also held that a state cannot terminate welfare benefits7
or suspend driver's licenses8 without affording notice and a hearing prior
to the deprivation of the entitlement. The application of procedural due
process safeguards to the garageman's lien on an automobile follows the
mandate of Fuentes v. Shevin, that "[a] ny significant taking of property
by the State is within the purview of the Due Process Clause."
The garageman's lien is an ex parte, prejudgment creditor's remedy.
Section 184 of the New York Lien Law provides that a garageman has a
lien upon a motor vehicle for the amount due for maintenance, storage,
or repairs and "may detain such motor vehicle ... at any time it may be
lawfully in his possession until such sum is paid . . . 2 0 The enforce-
ment provisions of the New York Lien Law authorize a garageman to
extinguish an owner's title and interest in a car by selling the vehicle."
Before the lien can be foreclosed, however, the lienholder must serve the
owner with a "notice of sale" containing a statement explaining the origin
of the lien, describing the property against which the lien exists including
the estimated value of the property, and verifying the amount of the
lien.12 If the debt is not paid within 10 days after service of the "notice
3. The district court issued an order temporarily restraining the sale of the automobile
while it heard the case. Appellant's car was sold after the court of appeals declined to grant
an extension of the restraining order pending appeal of the judgment of the district court.
4. Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223 (1863).
5. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) [hereinafter referred to as Snia-
dach].
6. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) [hereinafter referred to as Fuentes].
7. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
8. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Bell].
9. 407 U.S. 67, 86 (1972). Garageman's lien statutes have been invalidated in Georgia
and West Virginia as violating the due process requirements of the fourteenth amendment.
Mason v. Garris, 360 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Ga. 1973), Straley v. Gassaway Motor Co., 359
F. Supp. 902 (S.D.W. Va. 1973).
10. N.Y. Lien Law § 184 (McKinney 1966).
11. Id. § 200 (McKinney Supp. 1973).
12. Id. § 201.
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of sale" on the owner,1" the lienholder must then publish notice of the
sale in a local newspaper once a week for two consecutive weeks before
the automobile can be sold.'" "An amount sufficient to satisfy his lien
and the expenses of advertisement and sale" can then be retained by the
lienholder from the proceeds of the sale. 5
The garageman's statutory right to detain and impose a lien on an
automobile for storage and repair charges without a prior adjudication
to determine the validity of the lien was not in issue in Hernandez. The
controversy surrounded the sale provisions of the New York Lien Law
and the garageman's resulting power to foreclose a valid lien without a
prior adjudication of the amount of the lien. Appellant's challenge to the
garageman's right to detain the automobile was held moot. The garage
acquired possession of the automobile only after appellant voluntarily
surrendered it and "voluntarily incurred at least some storage charges"
entitling the garage to a lien for storage expenses."
Both the district court and the court of appeals in Hernandez held
that the sale provisions of the garageman's lien were subject to the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. But they differed as to how
the principles of due process should be applied to the sale provisions
of the statute. The district court relied upon its prior decision in Magro
v. Lentini Bros. Moving & Storage Co.,'" holding that due process of
law requires only that a debtor be given notice sufficient to afford him
an opportunity to seek relief in the courts.' 8 This, in effect, says that
the state may, in enacting a prejudgment creditor's remedy, place the
burden of obtaining a hearing prior to the deprivation of property on
the debtor rather than the creditor.
In Magro, the enforcement provisions of the New York warehouse-
man's lien were challenged on due process grounds. Plaintiffs' furniture
and household goods were sold at a public auction after they failed to
pay a bill for moving and storage fees. A self-help remedy, section 7-210
of the New York Uniform Commercial Code,' 9 permits a warehouseman
to execute on a lien without a prior adjudication of its amount. Before
the warehouseman is authorized to execute on the lien, the owner of the
goods must be notified of the intended foreclosure. The notice provisions
of section 7-210 are similar to the New York garageman's lien statute."
The district court in Magro upheld the warehouseman's lien against the
due process challenge: "[I]t was enough if notice was given to the person
13. Id.
14. Id. § 202.
15. Id. § 204.
16. 487 F.2d at 382.
17. 338 F. Supp. 464 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd mem., 460 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 961 (1972) [hereinafter referred to as Magro].
18. Hernandez v. European Auto Collision, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 313 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
19. N.Y.U.C.C. § 7-210 (McKinney 1964).
20. See N.Y.U.C.C. § 7-210(2) (McKinney 1964).
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to be deprived and that person had the opportunity to seek relief in the
courts."2'
Following the reasoning of the Magro decision, the district court in
Hernandez held that the appellant was not deprived of notice and an
opportunity for a hearing.22 The notice provisions of the garageman's
lien statute allow a minimum 24 day period between the time the owner
is served notice of an impending sale and the actual sale if the debt is
not paid.23 Should the owner of the car dispute the amount of the garage-
man's claim, he may on his own initiative challenge the garageman's
right to enforce the lien. The court noted that he may bring a replevin
action in a state court to challenge the detention of the automobile or
seek equitable relief to forestall the sale.24
The court of appeals rejected this argument. Judge Wyzanski, speak-
ing for the appellate court, tersely stated that the availability of a replevin
action or an equitable remedy in the state courts did not validate the sale
provisions of the New York garageman's lien statute so as to allow ap-
pellant's car to be sold without "judicial ascertainment of the amount
owed"25 to the defendant. In remanding the case to the district court for
a trial on the merits, the court of appeals concluded that appellant's
challenge to the sale provisions of the garageman's lien statute should be
examined in the light of the doctrines established in Fuentes v. Shevin,20
Bell v. Burson' and Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.28
A careful scrutiny of the language of the Court in Fuentes would
seem to indicate that the state may not place the burden of obtaining a
hearing, prior to a deprivation of his property, on the debtor. Prior notice
of an imminent deprivation of property without a formal opportunity to
be heard is not consistent with the underlying rationale of Fuentes:
"The constitutional right to be heard is a basic aspect of the duty of
government to follow a fair process of decisionmaking when it acts to
21. Magro v. Lentini Bros. Moving & Storage Co., 338 F. Supp. 464, 467 (E.D.N.Y. 1971),
aff'd mem., 460 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir.); cert. denied, 406 U.S. 961 (1972) (citing Anderson Nat'l
Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233 (1944)). Magro was decided after Sniadach but prior to
Fuentes. The district court in Magro interpreted Sniadach as applying only to specialized
types of property "the deprivation of which will drive the debtor 'to the wall.'" 338 F. Supp.
at 468. In a concurring opinion in Hernandez, Judge Timbers of the court of appeals noted
that Fuentes eliminated any distinction between specialized types of property and property in
general within the meaning of the due process clause. Judge Timbers believed that Magro was
of questionable validity after the Fuentes decision was rendered.
22. Hernandez v. European Auto Collision, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 313 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
23. N.Y. LIEN LAW § 201 (McKinney Supp. 1973). The district court in Hernandez at
319, relied on Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972). In Lindsey v. Normet the Supreme
Court upheld Oregon's Forcible Entry and Detainer Statute which required a tenant to
defend in an eviction proceeding within four days after a landlord filed an action. The Court
held that the statute which had been challenged on due process grounds provided the tenant
an opportunity to be heard prior to eviction, albeit a limited opportunity.
24. Hernandez v. European Auto Collision, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 313, 319 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
25. 487 F.2d at 383.
26. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
27. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
28. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
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deprive a person of his possessions. ' 29 If the state may, consistent with
the due process clause, shift the burden of obtaining a hearing to the
debtor whose property is threatened by the application of a creditor's
remedy, then the creditor benefits from a procedural advantage in what
is supposed to be a fair process of decision making. The Court in Fuentes
seems to have rejected the notion that the debtor's opportunity to be
heard prior to a deprivation of property is dependent upon his willing-
ness to initiate a law suit. Reviewing the wage garnishment statute in
Sniadack and the driver's license suspension procedure in Bell, the Court
noted that "these were deprivations of property that had to be preceded
by a fair hearing."3 0
The district court in Hernandez was also unwilling to interpret the
due process safeguards, established in Sniadach and Fuentes, as appli-
cable to creditor's remedies such as the garageman's lien statute, since
a sharp distinction could be drawn between the garnishment and replevin
statutes struck down in Sniadack and Fuentes and the New York garage-
man's lien statute.3' Appellant voluntarily parted with his car; there was
no seizure of property as in the garnishment and replevin cases. The
majority opinion of the court of appeals, written by Judge Wyzanski,
did not discuss the point. However, Judge Timbers, in a concurring
opinion, emphasized that the voluntariness of the transfer of property
to the garageman was not a pivotal distinction upon which the state
could bypass the requirement of providing a hearing before sanctioning
a deprivation of property. While it is true that appellant voluntarily
transferred possession of his car to the repairman, the transfer was for
a limited purpose and was never intended to be a voluntary relinquish-
ment of his property interest in the vehicle. 2
Comparing the garageman's lien statute to the replevin statutes
struck down in Fuentes, Judge Timbers concluded that "there would
appear to be an even greater disregard for the basic elements of due
process" in the former because the garageman's power to foreclose a lien
"completely extinguishes the possibility of any right of repossession in
the event of ultimate success on the merits .... "8 It is true that replevin
29. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972).
30. Id. at 85. Fuentes may conceivably be interpreted to mean that procedural due
process only requires an opportunity to be heard if the debtor initiates an action in court to
contest a creditor's claim against him. Support for the argument can be found in the Court's
statements that "we deal here only with the right to an opportunity to be heard." Id. at 92
n.29 (emphasis in original); and, quoting Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 343
(1969), that "due process is afforded only by the kinds of 'notice' and 'hearing' which are
aimed at establishing the validity, or at least probable validity, of the underlying claim against
the alleged debtor before he can be deprived of his property. .. " 407 U.S. at 97 (emphasis
in original).
31. Hernandez v. European Auto Collision, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 313, 318 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
32. 487 F.2d at 385.
33. 487 F.2d at 385.
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involves a seizure of property rather than a voluntary transfer as in the
lien cases. However, replevin is a "provisional remedy" providing for an
eventual hearing after seizure of the goods34
The court of appeals was not asked to determine whether there is
state action in the enforcement of the New York garageman's lien statute.
The district court, having determined that no federal claim was stated
upon which relief could be granted in appellant's complaint, left open
the question whether there was state action in the enactment of a statute
which allows a private individual to foreclose a garageman's lien by self
help. However, by way of dictum, the district court indicated that state
action, which is a necessary predicate to federal jurisdiction under title
42 of the United States Code, section 1983 and title 28 of the United
States Code, section 1343 seemed to be manifest in the instant case.
"Though he is a private individual, the lienor through the public auc-
tioneer it has retained is performing a traditionally public function pur-
suant to a right accorded it by a state statute."
85
There are strong policy considerations in favor of extending the
protection of the right to notice and a formal hearing to the enforcement
provisions of the garageman's lien statute. Without an opportunity for
a prior judicial determination of the amount of the debt claimed as a
lien by a garageman, the statute gives the garageman an economic lever-
age over the car owner who questions the value of his services. If the
owner's only opportunity to challenge a dubious or even fraudulent claim
is by bringing a law suit, the garageman has a procedural advantage over
the car owner. The time and money spent on hiring a lawyer are a real
deterrent to the car owner whose challenge to the garageman's claim may
be legitimate3 It may be cheaper for the car owner to passively acquiesce
in the garageman's determination of the amount of the debt than to
contest it.
By conditioning the enforcement of the garageman's remedy upon
the requirement that the owner of the car must be afforded an oppor-
tunity for a prior adjudication after notice and hearing of a threatened
deprivation of his property, the possibility of economic coercion is elimi-
34. See, e.g., FrA. STAT. ch 78 (1969). The Florida replevin statute struck down in
Fuentes provided for an opportunity for a hearing after seizure of the goods.
39. Hernandez v. European Auto Collision, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 313, 317 n.4 (E.D.N.Y.
1972). Judge Timbers of the court of appeals observed in his concurring opinion in Hernandez
that the absence of an opportunity for a prior judicial determination of the amount of the
lien "makes the statute a party to the deprivation of a significant property interest without
the right to the basic protection of the Fourteenth Amendment." 487 F.2d at 386.
See Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (state action present in enactment
of innkeeper's lien statute) ; Collins v. Viceroy Hotel Corp., 338 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. InI. 1972)
(state action present in innkeeper's lien statute); Adams v. Egley, 332 F. Supp. 614 (S.D.
Cal. 1972), rev'd Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 113 UCC REP. SERv. 161 (9th
Cir. 1973.) (presence of state action in enactment of Cal. Commercial Code §§ 9503, 9504).
36. See, Comment, The Application of Sniadach to Banker's and Garageman's Liens, 4
Sw. U.L. REv. 285 (1972).
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